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ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty 
     Signed on May 26, 1972 by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev and ratified 88-
2 by the U.S. Senate on August 2, 1972, this agreement ostensibly limited the U.S. 
and Soviet Union to deploying two anti-ballistic missile sites within their national 
territories.    One U.S. site housed at Grand Forks, North Dakota, housed 
Safeguard ABMs and another site, which was never built, was intended to defend 
the Washington, DC area.  Moscow was the primary Soviet site.  Treaty provisions 
also limited each site to 100 missiles and launchers, 15 additional launchers at 
test sites, regulated the types of radars at each site, and implicitly recognized the 
value of space-based reconnaissance to ensure compliance with arms control 
agreements.  A 1974 protocol reduced the number of ABM sites each country 
could deploy to one.  This agreement represented the apex of the nuclear 
doctrine of mutual assured destruction and had many defenders in international 
foreign policy and security communities who believed it would regulate 
proliferation of nuclear missiles. 
     It was repeatedly violated by the Soviets, however, as evidenced by ABM 
facilities at Krasnoyarsk and Plesetsk.  The treaty also encountered increasing 
criticism from Republican presidential administrations and congressional critics 
who believed it limited the United States’ ability to defend itself from emerging 
ballistic missile threats.  Its value deteriorated drastically after the Cold War, as 
ballistic missile technology proliferated to countries such as Iran, Iraq, North 
Korea, and Pakistan.  China never adhered to the treaty.  Increasing U.S. concerns 
that proliferation of this technology would also reach transnational terrorists, as 
well as rogue regimes, and inhibit United States and other countries’ efforts to 
develop ballistic missile defense systems lead the United States to withdraw from 
the ABM Treaty in 2001. 
     This withdrawal met a muted reaction from Russia and the ABM Treaty’s legacy 
must be seen as an example of an arms control agreement failing to keep up with 
proliferating and advancing weapons technologies, and the desire of countries 
such as the United States and its allies to defend themselves against the 
increasing threat posed by conventional weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction delivered by ballistic missiles. 
                                                                                                Bert Chapman  
See also:  Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906-1982) 
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